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Abstract
The Dutch have a long tradition of hospitality towards ethnic immigrants.
In the nineties, however, quite dramatic changes have taken place among 
the Dutch. The central question addressed in this contribution is: to what 
extent do specific categories within the electorate favour ethnocentric 
policies? This question is answered by deducing hypotheses that are tested 
using recent data polled within the framework of the Dutch National 
Election Studies. Our crucial conclusion is that a rather widespread support 
for ethnocentric policies is present in contemporary Dutch society, 
especially among manual labourers, self-employed and lowly educated 
people, but also among young cohorts and among modal income categories.
Keywords: Electoral support; unequal treatment of ethnic minorities; ethno­
centric policies.
Introduction and questions
For centuries, The Netherlands has hospitably received immigrants. 
Dutch history books have not revealed any major incidents or public 
resistance related to these foreigners (Lucassen and Penninx 1985/1994). 
However, since the seventies there have been reports on a changing  
political climate (Bovenkerk 1978). By the turn of the decade, from the 
eighties to the nineties, it had becom e clear that an ever growing number  
of immigrants would seek safe shelter in The Netherlands as in many 
other West European countries. By then, growing resistance among the 
public was readily observable, both in The Netherlands and in many other  
West European countries.
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This public resistance has more often been brought to the fore by 
extreme right-wing parties. Their main political themes relate to the 
(growing) presence of non-indigenous ethnic groups (Maolain 1987). In 
general, these parties are highly ethnocentric and consequently they 
propose ethnocentric policies. For instance, they strongly object to the 
immigration of foreign ethnic groups; they question the right to equal 
treatment of ethnic groups in society; and they object to government  
intervention to improve the social position of ethnic groups.
These political changes have clearly altered the political agenda and 
public agenda, as was demonstrated by previous survey research on 
ethnocentric policies. Research in 1989 showed that only 7 per cent of the 
electorate considered the presence of ethnic minorities to be one of the 
major national problems (Schmeets and Elkink 1994).1
This quite dramatic shift in the public agenda of the Dutch gives rise 
to several questions, all related to ethnocentric policies. Specific research 
questions relate to concrete policy proposals, nowadays discussed in most 
European parliaments by mainstream political parties as well as by kthe 
man in the street'. To what extent is the Dutch electorate in favour of an 
immigration stop? To what extent does the Dutch electorate question  
equal treatment of ethnic minorities? And to what extent does the Dutch  
electorate object to government intervention to improve the social situ­
ation of ethnic minorities? A more specific question is: which social cat­
egories in the Dutch electorate are in favour of these ethnocentric  
policies?
Theories and hypotheses
In the domain of ethnocentric reactions, two rather general theoretical 
traditions may be discerned, following Case et al. (1989).
First, there are theories that focus on the class position of indigenous  
people who experience competition for scarce resources with non- 
indigenous ethnic minorities. These theories have, in one way or another, 
been strongly inspired by the classic study by Coser who, in turn, had 
been strongly inspired by Marx s and SimmeTs thought. Coser (1956) 
proposed that there was continuous competition between ethnic groups, 
just as there was competition between social classes, for scarce resources. 
This competition would induce hostile feelings between ethnic groups 
but would also increase feelings of solidarity within ethnic groups. 
Blalock (1967) translated these general theoretical views to the ethnic  
situation of the United States. He proposed that this competition  
between ethnic groups w'ould only induce ethnocentric reactions if 
members of ethnic groups were aware of the actual competition for 
scarce resources like labour, housing and social security. Levine and 
Campbell (1972) labelled this tradition ‘realistic group conflict theories' 
to which many authors have ascribed great empirical value (Schaefer and
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Six 1978; Castles and Kosack 1985). These views have been included in 
empirical research (A shm ore and Delboca 1976; Olzak and Nagel 1986) 
and have not yet been refuted.
These views have been recently specified with the sociological notion  
that ethnocentric reactions may be stronger among social classes that 
perceive these competitive relations daily, being confronted with non- 
indigenous competitors (Eisinga and Scheepers 1989). This rather 
straightforward theoretical notion implies that the more frequently one  
perceives ethnic groups as competitors, the more strongly one's e thno­
centric reaction, the more strongly one is in favour of ethnocentric poli­
cies in order to protect one's social position in a virtual continuous  
competition. Considering the contemporary social position of ethnic 
minorities, who are strongly overrepresented among the unemployed as 
well as among the social classes performing manual labour (Roelandt et 
al. 1993), we would hypothesize that:
/. Ethnocentric policies are supported by those who are unemployed;
2. Ethnocentric policies are supported by those performing manual 
labour.
But there are exceptions to these general observations on the social 
positions of ethnic minorities in The Netherlands. Recent findings show  
that som e categories of migrants have improved their social position by 
means of so-called ‘ethnic enterprising’: they have opened shops, provid­
ing goods and services to mainly Dutch customers (Lindo 1994). But this 
rather fortunate developm ent may have led the Dutch self-employed to 
perceive these ethnic enterprises as competitors in the small market, just 
as Bonacich and Modell (1980) have described ethnocentric reactions of  
shopkeepers towards ethnic enterprises.2 These considerations lead us to 
hypothesize that:
3. Ethnocentric policies are supported by those who are self-employed.
A  second theoretical tradition focuses on the culture of specific cat­
egories. In this second tradition one also finds theoretical notions focus­
ing on specific categories that may experience other ethnic groups as a 
threat to the persistence of their own culture, because they lack sophisti­
cated knowledge about these other ethnic groups.
Gabennesch (1972) made an important contribution to this tradition. 
He ascertained that empirical research showed a rather consistent 
relationship between educational attainment and intolerance, that is, 
ethnocentric reactions. He tried to interpret this empirical relationship. 
He proposed that education in school might broaden o n e ’s breadth of  
perspective as it makes one familiar with other cultures, having other  
norms and values that are different from but not necessarily a threat to 
one's own culture. This idea on breadth of perspective is also present in 
notions put forward by R oof  (1974). He, too, claims that the longer one  
enjoys education in school, the less localistic, the more cosmopolitic and 
hence the more tolerant of other cultures one becomes. These notions
imply that the more highly educated one is, the more sophisticated one's  
knowledge about the culture o f  other groups, the less ethnocentric one  
is, the less one is prone to ethnocentric policies (Quinley and Glock  
1979). From these theoretical considerations we derive that:
4. The less education one has enjoyed, the stronger one supports eth­
nocentric policies.
This notion on breadth of perspective might also be applicable to the 
relationship between age and ethnocentric reactions. Two arguments  
have been put forward to substantiate this notion (cf. Jagodzinsky and 
Kuehnel 1987). One argument relates to the specific cohort-socialization  
that one has experienced: if one has grown up in a mono-ethnic society  
in which hardly any other ethnic groups were present, then one might be 
in favour of ethnocentric policies in order to protect one's mono-ethnic  
culture. The other argument relates to the effect of ageing: the older one  
grows, the more difficult it becom es to accept other ethnic groups with 
other cultures, norms and values, the more ethnocentric, and hence the 
more in favour of ethnocentric policies, one becom es in order to protect 
one's own culture. O f course, it is not possible in cross-sectional research 
to distinguish both effects, cohort and ageing. But these considerations  
lead us anyway to hypothesize that:
5. The older one is, the more strongly one supports ethnocentric poli­
cies.
In addition to these theories on ethnocentric reactions, there is abun­
dant research showing that religion is also related to ethnocentric reac­
tions (cf. Eisinga et al. 1988: 1990). Another variable might also be 
important, for instance, the level of income (for an overview: Schuman et 
al. 1985). We shall not go into these details but we shall include these vari­
ables in the analyses to ascertain the net effects of the categories m en­
tioned in the hypotheses.
Data and measurements
We relied on data gathered within the framework of the Dutch National 
Election Study in 1994. The sampling design consisted of a two-stage  
random sample .3 Eventually, 1,527 persons were interviewed face to face 
with the aid of hand-held computers. Due to selectivity in the response  
pattern, the sample turned out to contain slight deviations from the 
national distributions. After reweighting (Schmeets and Molin 1990), it 
appeared to be justified to consider the data representative of the Dutch 
population (CBS 1994).
In order to measure our dependent variables, that is, aspects of  
ethnocentric policies, we developed  three different measurements. The 
first one relates to the policy to halt (or reduce) the number of immi­
grants. In The Netherlands, three different types of immigrants are dis­
tinguished about whom questions were submitted to the respondents
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asking whether immigration should be without limitation, reduced or 
stopped completely. We suspected that the Dutch would distinguish 
between these categories, som e categories o f  immigrants being treated 
less or more strictly than others, which is why we performed probabilis­
tic scalogram analysis. It turned out that the items could be ordered  
along a strong underlying one-dim ensional cumulative scale (H = .63). 
About 29 per cent of the Dutch would like to stop immigration of labour 
migrants from countries outside the EU; 16 per cent favoured a stop on 
asylum seekers; and 14 per cent favoured a stop on labour migrants from 
countries inside the EU. The answers o f  those in favour of an immigra­
tion stop were summ ed, resulting in scores ranging from 0 -3  (see Table 
1). It transpired that nearly 10 per cent (cf. Table 1) o f  the Dutch e lec ­
torate would like to close the borders altogether for whatever immi­
grants.
The second m easurem ent relates to the issue whether there should be 
equal treatment o f  all foreign ethnic groups. We used two questions in 
which a hypothetical case relating to the labour market was submitted  
to respondents. Respondents were asked which person they would dis­
charge if they had to lay one o f  them off: a foreigner or a Dutchman; a 
‘co lou red ’ person or a white person. The respondents who would dis­
charge the foreigner or the ‘co lou red ’ person were assumed to be in 
favour of unequal treatment, which in The Netherlands is forbidden by 
law. Both questions appeared to be highly associated (phi = .51). We 
sum m ed the answers of those in favour of  unequal treatment resulting 
in scores ranging from 0 -2  (cf. Table 2). The result was that nearly 17 
per cent of the Dutch electorate consistently favoured unequal treat­
ment.
The third measurement relates to the governmental policy to improve 
the social situation of ethnic minorities. We used a single straightforward 
question on the policy of affirmative action. It appeared that 21.5 per cent 
of the Dutch electorate strongly opposed this policy (cf. Table 3). Let us 
now turn to the independent variables.
First, we constructed a social class variable derived from Erikson, 
Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983). This categorization of social class 
was only applied to those actually active in the labour market. Other  
people were also categorized according to their main daily activity: 
students, housewives, people doing voluntary unpaid work and people  
dependent on social security. These classifications are necessary to test 
hypotheses 1 to 3. In order to test hypothesis 4 , we measured the edu­
cational level completed by the respondents, ranging from primary 
school to university degree. In order to test hypothesis 5, we measured  
age by means of birthday. This variable was categorized in order to detect 
specific categories supporting ethnocentric policies. As control variables 
we included level of income and church attendance (cf. Eisinga et al.
1988).
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Table 1. In favour o f  immigration stop
multiple regression with nominal variables (n=1527, **=p<.025, one-tailed test, 
t>l .96, *=p<.05, one-tailed test, t>l .65
0
not at all
1 2 3
yes
general mean 62.58 15.75 11.98 9.69
Class categories
directors 6.03 ** — 3.66 -1 .34 **-4.19
managers **11.99 -2.60 **-3.23 **-5.80
routine non-manuals **13.21 ** — 6.65 -1 .27 *-5.06
self-employed -4.09 8.10 1.13 -4.92
skilled manuals -9 .09 9.00 4.95 -5 .72
unskilled manuals -4.16 -4.53 *4.60 4.22
students 3.44 5.03 *-4.94 -3.77
housewives -4.55 -.81 2.36 *2.87
volunteers -3.02 -1.77 3.59 1.34
dependants -1.36 *4.21 -4 .64 2.31
Age categories
17-24 **17.24 * * - 8.12 -4 .18 *-4 .48
25-34 1.00 -2 .07 *-1.08 2.14
35-44 -8.18 1.37 - .35 **6.84
45-54 -6.93 *5.57 1.63 - .27
55-64 -3.41 - .08 **4.86 -1 .53
65-74 -4 .20 6.04 -2.57 .55
75- 15.77 -4.22 *3.11 *-4.33
Income categories
minimum -1.65 2.47 *2.91 **-2.80
below modal .95 - .3 9 -1 .89 *1.26
modal -5.52 -1.84 1.98 *5.13
above modal 2.41 .03 .36 -2 .64
two times modal 2.26 3.15 - .43 **-5.30
Educational categories
elementarv school **-12.09 -3.13 **5.34 **9.92
lower vocational school **-4.38 **3.24 1.04 .25
o- and a- levels 1.06 1.91 .05 **-3.02
professional training **16.27 -3.04 **-7.92 **-5.24
completed university **17.83 **-7.55 **-5.24 **-6.07
Church involvement
categories
unchurched .02 **-1.52 - .25 **1.26
non-practising member **-7.53 **4.22 2.30 .44
marginal member -.65 -1.96 - .95 3.54
modal member 4.48 1.74 - 1.21 **-4.71
Explained variance 10.61 1.82 2.53 10.34
Legends for top of row:
0 = not at all = not at all in favour of an immigration  stop
1 = in favour of  an immigration  s top for one category  o f ‘fo re igners’
2 = in favour of an immigration  stop for two categories  o f ‘fo re igners’
3 = yes = in favour of a full immigration  stop
# Fortress Holland? 151
Table 2. Unequal treatment o f  [foreigners'
multiple regression with nominal variables (n=1527, **=p<.025, one-tailed test, 
t> 1.96, *=p<.05, one-tailed test, t> 1.65
0 1 2
general mean 61.10 22.00 16.90
Class categories
directors 4.86 -4.14 .73
managers 8.16 -3 .78 -4.03
routine non-manuals **13.76 *-7.01 *-5.94
self-employed *-4.76 *8.25 -3.43
skilled manuals **-7.43 **9.67 -3.35
unskilled manuals -5.39 *14.07 -8.87
students - .72 .88 -1 .39
housewives *-5.68 - .75 **6.31
volunteers .29 -1 .60 1.51
dependants 8.00 -3 .57 *-3.83
Age categories
17-24 *-2.81 -5.14 **8.35
25-34 2.96 *-4.65 2.17
35-44 1.01 -4 .06 3.10
45-54 **3.62 .01 **-4.20
55-64 -1 .09 3.86 -3 .54
65-74 - .3 6 *8.06 -7.21
75- **-12.18 **15.78 -3.89
Income categories
minimum **4.79 - 1.00 -2.91
below modal -1.79 - .85 2.57
modal *-7.07 -5 .24 1.71
above modal 4.69 -1.37 -3.40
two times modal 4.63 -3 .00 -.91
Educational categories
elementary school **-9.91 .05 **10.15
lower vocational school .68 - 1.11 .98
o- and a- levels .24 .91 -1.29
professional training **9.01 - .07 **-9.24
completed university **9.93 - .67 **-11.17
Church involvement
categories
unchurched 1.01 - .25 -.91
non-practising member
4
.15
f
-2 .83 2.45
marginal member -8.87 5.03 4.08
modal member 3.02 - .82 -1.91
Explained variance 7.06 2.28 5.67
Legends for top of row:
0 = in favour of  equal  t rea tm en t  of ‘foreigners '
1 = in favour of  unequa l  t rea tm en t  of one category  of  ‘fo re igners’
2 = in favour of  unequa l  t rea tm en t  of  two categories  of ‘foreigners '
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Table 3. Affirmative action
multiple regression with nominal variables (n=1527, **=p<.025, one-tailed lest, 
t>1.96, *=p<.05, one-tailed test, t> l .65
contra
general mean 21.48
Class categories
directors - .84
managers -1.78
routine non-manuals - .53
self-employed 6.65
skilled manuals .34
unskilled manuals -3.47
students **-19.24
housewives 2.35
volunteers 6.39
dependants 1.79
Age categories
17-24 10.58
25-34 .78
35-44 2.98
45-54 -4.67
55-64 -3 .90
65-74 -4.07
75- -6.15
Income categories
minimum 5.44
below modal - .72
modal .58
above modal - 2.02
two times modal 2.99
Educational categories
elementary school **5.23
lower vocational school 79
o- and a- levels -1 .90
professional training **-10.83
completed university **-6.58
Church involvement
categories
unchurched 1.15
non-practising member 6.47
marginal member 1.76
modal member **-6.80
Explained variance 3.92
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Analysis
In the analyses we have to take account of the fact that our dependent  
variables are all nominal. This type of variable has often been  
approached by logistic regression from which difficulties often arise due 
to the interpretation of parameters. Recently, a procedure to overcome  
such difficulties has been introduced: regression analysis with nominal 
variables (R E N O V A : cf. Lammers and Pelzer 1992). This statistical pro­
gramme provides the same possibilities as conventional multiple regres­
sion analysis does. The main difference with conventional regression 
analysis is that nominal dependent variables may also be included in 
R E N O V A .
Let us first explain the interpretation of the parameters presented in 
the tables in general before we present the results of the analyses in 
greater detail. All the figures in the tables are multiple regression effects  
and have hence been controlled for other predictors in the equations. The 
effects in each column have been derived from a regression equation for 
one of the categories of the dependent variables mentioned at the top of  
that column. The first cells of these columns contain the intercepts that 
reflect the general percentages of people who are in favour of this type 
of ethnocentric policy. These parameters serve as references in inter­
preting the parameters in the column cells. The latter parameters indi­
cate to what extent the people in this category support a certain type of  
ethnocentric policy, as a deviation from the intercept and controlling for 
other variables in the equation. N ow  let us turn to the results of the analy­
ses in more detail.
Results
Hypothesis 1 claims that ethnocentric policies will be strongly supported  
by unemployed people who depend on social security, that is, labelled  
‘dependants’ in the tables. From Table 1 we derive that there is a ten­
dency among these people to be in favour of an immigration stop for at 
least one category of migrants (indicated by a significant parameter  
amounting to 4.21). But among dependants we find no significant differ­
ences from the general population regarding support for a complete  
immigration stop as this parameter (2.31) does not reach significance. In 
Table 2 we find that among people depending on social security, there is 
significantly less support for unequal treatment of ‘foreigners' (-3 .83)  
which is contrary to our hypothesis. In Table 3 we find no more support 
for affirmative action regarding ethnic minorities among dependants  
than in the general population. These findings lead us to reject our first 
hypothesis as the analyses do not provide clear corroborative evidence.
Hypothesis 2 claims that ethnocentric policies will be favoured by 
people who perform manual labour. Table 1 shows a tendency that
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belonging to the class of unskilled labourers increases the chance o f  their 
being in favour of an immigration stop for some categories of immigrants, 
but only one of these parameters (i.e. 4.60 in the fourth column of this 
table) reaches significance, meaning that unskilled labourers support 
restrictive immigration policies for two out of three categories of immi­
grants. A m ong the class of skilled labourers we find no significant differ­
ences from the general population regarding support for restrictive 
immigration policies. In Table 2 we find among both skilled and unskilled 
labourers more support to treat one of the categories of foreigners 
unequally, that is, in the case of a worker having to be laid off, as indi­
cated by the significant parameters in the third column amounting to 9.67 
for skilled labourers and 14.07 for unskilled labourers. In Table 3, 
however, we find that neither skilled nor unskilled labourers differ sig­
nificantly from the general electorate regarding opposition to affirmative 
action. These findings lead us to accept partially our second hypothesis. 
Apparently, manual workers support policies to treat foreigners  
unequally in the labour market. But only among unskilled workers do we 
find fairly strong support to stop the migration of foreigners.
Hypothesis 3 claims that belonging to the class of self-employed  
increases the chance to favour ethnocentric policies. Table 1 shows that 
among self-employed people we find some support to stop immigration 
of at least one category of migrants, indicated by a significant parameter  
of 8.10 in the second column of this table: they seem  most likely to favour 
stopping immigration of immigrants from outside the EU. Table 2 shows  
the same pattern as described for the skilled manual workers. A m on g  
self-employed people we also find significantly less support for equal 
treatment of foreigners (indicated by a parameter of - 4 .7 6  in the second  
column) and a tendency to dismiss one of the categories of foreigners in 
the case of a worker having to be laid off, as indicated by a significant 
parameter amounting to 8.25 in the third column of this table. Regard­
ing affirmative action, we find a relatively strong opposition among self- 
em ployed people, as indicated by a parameter amounting to 6.65, but this 
parameter does not have any significance. These findings led us to accept 
hypothesis 3, at least partially.
Hypothesis 4 claims that strong support for ethnocentric policies will 
be found among the lowly educated. All three tables show that this 
hypothesis is to be accepted. Belonging to the category of people who  
have only finished elementary school increases the chance of their being  
in favour of an absolute immigration stop (Table 1: 9.92); to treat for­
eigners unequally (Table 2: 10.15); and to oppose affirmative action 
(Table 3: 5.23). These findings lead us to accept this hypothesis for the 
people who have only finished elementary schooling.
Hypothesis 5 claims that ethnocentric policies will be strongly sup­
ported by older people. Table 1 shows that regarding a full immigration 
stop, the older-age categories deviate from general public opinion.
A m ong the people over seventy-five years of age we find less support for 
this stringent immigration policy. A m on g  people aged between fifty-five 
and sixty-four as among the oldest category we find support for the policy 
to stop at least two out of the three categories of migrants, indicated by 
significant parameters (that is, 4.86 and 3.11) in the fourth column. 
Regarding unequal treatment,Table 2 shows som e support among people  
over sixty-five years of age to dismiss som e categories of foreigners in the 
case o f  workers having to be laid off, as indicated by significant par­
ameters (that is, 8.06 and 15.78) in the third column of this table. C on­
trary to our hypothesis on the older-age categories, we find especially  
among the younger cohorts (aged seventeen to twenty-four) support for 
ethnocentric policies, especially on the unequal treatment of foreigners 
(Table 2: 8.35). This circumstantial evidence leads us to reject our orig­
inal hypothesis on the older cohorts: instead, among the youngest cohorts 
we find more support for ethnocentric policies.
Next to the findings directly related to our hypothesis, there are some  
findings worth mentioning, especially related to one of our other control 
variables, namely, level of income. Contrary to the hypothesis on the 
lower strata supposedly in favour of ethnocentric policies, we find that 
among people earning a minimum income there is less support for a full 
immigration stop. But among the people earning a modal income we find 
stronger support for this type of policy indicated by a significant para­
meter of 5.13 in the last column of Table ]. A m on g  the people in this 
modal income category we also find significantly less support to treat for­
eigners equally in the labour market, indicated by a parameter of -7 .07  
in the second column of Table 2. We shall try to interpret these findings 
in the last paragraph.
Conclusions and discussion
Since the turn of the decade, it seem s the people of The Netherlands have 
shown a growing resistance towards ethnic immigration, resulting in a 
more widespread subscription to political ideas and ethnocentric policies, 
more than often proposed by extreme right-wing parties. Indeed, we 
found that nearly 40 per cent of the Dutch electorate was in favour of  
stopping immigration of at least some categories of immigrants; and 
nearly 10 per cent of the electorate wished to close the borders altogether  
for whatever category of immigrants. We suppose that these figures do
J
not lend support to the idea o f ‘fortress Holland', but they appear at least 
remarkable for a country that has enjoyed a long-lasting tradition of hos­
pitality towards immigrants. Second, it transpired that nearly 40 per cent 
of the electorate questioned equal treatment o f  som e categories of for­
eigners; and 17 per cent of the electorate favoured unequal treatment in 
the labour market of foreigners in general. This figure also appears to be 
remarkable in The Netherlands, where unequal treatment of any
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minority is forbidden by law. Third, we found that 21 per cent of the 
Dutch electorate strongly opposed affirmative action.
We tried to detect specific social categories in which these ethnocentric  
policies were more strongly subscribed to than in general. We had to 
reject hypothesis 7, claiming that the unemployed, in particular, would be 
strongly in favour of these policies. We partially accepted hypotheses 2 
and 3 , claiming that those performing manual labour and people who are 
self-employed subscribe to ethnocentric policies. Their ethnocentric  
stances may be explained in terms of perceived competition: these class 
categories, working in partially the same segments of the labour market 
as immigrant groups, may perceive these immigrants as competitors for 
jobs and other scarce resources. Hence, these class categories are most 
likely to consider the presence of ethnic minorities as an econom ic threat, 
resulting in support for unequal treatment of these minorities in the 
labour market.
We most certainly accepted hypothesis 4 , claiming that particularly 
lowly-educated people would be in favour of  ethnocentric policies. We 
interpreted their ethnocentric stances in terms of  their relative lack of  
cognitive sophistication regarding the culture, values and norms of the 
‘other' ethnic groups. We rejected hypothesis 5, claiming that older  
cohorts would favour ethnocentric policies, partially based on circum­
stantial evidence: not particularly the older cohorts, but rather the 
youngest cohorts are in general more highly educated than the older  
cohorts, and hence more cognitively sophisticated regarding other ethnic 
groups, one com es to suspect that ethnic minorities are regarded as an 
econom ic threat to younger cohorts, supposedly making it more difficult 
for younger cohorts to enter the labour market. This finding is quite new. 
In previous Dutch studies the younger cohorts always appeared to be 
among the least ethnocentric (cf. Scheepers et al. 1989,1990; D ekker and 
Ester 1993). Another remarkable finding is that people earning a modal 
income revealed strong support for a full immigration stop and less 
support for equal treatment of foreigners in the labour market. This 
finding is also quite new, because ethnocentric reactions previously  
appeared to prevail in the lower-income categories (cf. Scheepers et al. 
1990; Dekker and Ester 1993). These modal income categories were also 
suspected to harbour ethnocentric feelings but were assumed to be clever  
enough not to reveal them in face-to-face interviews. This new finding 
may be explained in terms of the theory on ‘modern racism' (Pettigrew  
1994). Further research will have to shed som e light on this preliminary 
hypothesis.
An important question remains: will this backlash among the e lec ­
torate in general but more specifically among the younger cohorts and 
among modal-income categories be temporary, or will it turn out to be 
the beginning of a trend towards widespread ethnocentric reactions? 
Time will tell. Having ascertained an ethnocentric backlash in a country
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that only recently belonged to one of the most tolerant countries in 
Europe (D ekker  and van Praag 1990), one begins to wonder what kind 
of changes have taken place meanwhile in other EU-countries under 
rather equivalent circumstances. To answer these questions, one will have 
to wait for the data on ‘national identity' gathered within the framework  
of the International Social Survey Program 1995.
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Notes
1. This finding as such does  not indicate that half the D utch  e lec to ra te  held 
unfavourab le  views on e thnic  minorities. But o th e r  researches  showed, m ore  in general,  
that  a favourab le  a t t i tude  towards  e thnic  ou tg roups  had decreased  in a relatively short  
t im e-span  (SC P 1994; Scheepers  et al. 1994).
2. M uch the sam e hypo theses  may be deduced  from a different approach  that stems 
from F ro m m  (1929/1983) and  A d o rn o  et al. (1950/1982) up to M eloen  (1983). This tradition 
s tar ts  from quite  d ifferent points  of view as co m p ared  to the realistic g roup  conflict theories, 
as it focuses on socio-econom ic c ircum stances  inducing psychological reactions, i.e., a u th o r ­
itarianism as a set of a t t i tudinal  dispositions that may lead to e thnocen tr ic  reactions. E v e n ­
tually, however ,  the hypo theses  derived  from these theoretical  notions are highly similar to 
the ones  der ived  from the realistic g roup  conflict theories. These  hypotheses  also focus on 
e thnocen tr ic  reac tions  am o n g  unem ployed ,  m anual  labourers  and the self-employed, 
leading us to no  addit ional  hypotheses  on specific categories  in favour of e thnocen tr ic  poli­
cies (cf. Scheepers  et al. 1990).
3. In the first stage a n u m b e r  of municipalit ies were  d raw n according to the distribution 
of  provinces, degree  of u rban iza t ion  and  n u m b e r  of inhabitants.  In the second stage a 
n u m b e r  of addresses  within these municipalit ies were  draw n randomly. From all eligible 
citizens (over  e igh teen  years  and having Dutch  nationality) ,  persons  were selected r a n ­
domly.
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